The "SURGE" Was Not Prime Reason For Reduced Violence In Iraq -- Bob Woodward's New Book

"The book ["The War Within"] portrays an administration riven by
dissension, either unwilling or slow to confront the deterioration of
its strategy in Iraq during the summer and early fall of 2006."

"In response to a question about how the White House settled on a
troop surge of five brigades after the military leadership in
Washington had reluctantly said it could provide two, Bush said:
'Okay, I don't know this. I'm not in these meetings, you'll be happy
to hear, because I got other things to do.' "

"Nor, Woodward reports, did Bush express much urgency for change
during the months when sectarian killings and violent attacks against
U.S. forces in Iraq began rising, reaching more than 1,400 incidents a
week by October 2006 -- an average of more than eight an hour."

"[Gen. George W.] Casey, the president's commanding general in Iraq
from 2004 to 2007, came to believe that Bush did not understand the
nature of the Iraq war, that the president focused too much on body
counts as a measure of progress ... 'Casey had long concluded that one
big problem with the war was the president himself," Woodward writes.
"He later told a colleague in private that he had the impression that
Bush reflected the 'radical wing of the Republican Party that kept
saying, "Kill the bastards! Kill the bastards! And you'll succeed.' "

--------------------------------------------------------

"U.S. Spied on Iraqi Leaders, Book Says"

"Woodward Also Reveals That Political Fears Kept War Strategy Review
'Under the Radar'"

By Steve Luxenberg
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, September 5, 2008; A01



The Bush administration has conducted an extensive spying operation on
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, his staff and others in the Iraqi
government, according to a new book by Washington Post associate
editor Bob Woodward.

"We know everything he says," according to one of multiple sources
Woodward cites about the practice in "The War Within: A Secret White
House History, 2006-2008," scheduled for release Monday.

The book also says that the U.S. troop "surge" of 2007, in which
President Bush sent nearly 30,000 additional U.S. combat forces and
support troops to Iraq, was not the primary factor behind the steep
drop in violence there during the past 16 months.

Rather, Woodward reports, "groundbreaking" new covert techniques
enabled U.S. military and intelligence officials to locate, target and
kill insurgent leaders and key individuals in extremist groups such as
al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Woodward does not disclose the code names of these covert programs or
provide much detail about them, saying in the book that White House
and other officials cited national security concerns in asking him to
withhold specifics.

Overall, Woodward writes, four factors combined to reduce the
violence: the covert operations; the influx of troops; the decision by
militant cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to rein in his powerful Mahdi Army;
and the so-called Anbar Awakening, in which tens of thousands of
Sunnis turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq and allied with U.S. forces.

The book is Woodward's fourth to examine the inner debates of the Bush
administration and its handling of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The
Washington Post will run a four-part series based on the book
beginning Sunday. Fox News published a report about the book on its
Web site last night after obtaining a copy ahead of the release date.

The 487-page book concentrates on Bush's leadership and governing
style, based on more than 150 interviews with the president's national
security team, senior deputies and other key intelligence, diplomatic
and military players. Woodward also conducted two on-the-record
interviews with Bush in May.

The book portrays an administration riven by dissension, either
unwilling or slow to confront the deterioration of its strategy in
Iraq during the summer and early fall of 2006. Publicly, Bush
maintained that U.S. forces were "winning"; privately, he came to
believe that the military's long-term strategy of training Iraq
security forces and handing over responsibility to the new Iraqi
government was failing. Eventually, Woodward writes, the president
lost confidence in the two military commanders overseeing the war at
the time: Gen. George W. Casey Jr., then commander of coalition forces
in Iraq, and Gen. John P. Abizaid, then head of U.S. Central Command.

In October 2006, the book says, Bush asked Stephen J. Hadley, his
national security adviser, to lead a closely guarded review of the
Iraq war. That first assessment did not include military participants
and proceeded secretly because of White House fears that news coverage
of a review might damage Republican chances in the midterm
congressional elections.

"We've got to do it under the radar screen because the electoral
season is so hot," Hadley is quoted as telling Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, who is described as challenging the president on the
wisdom of sending additional troops to Iraq. "You're not getting a
clear picture of what's going on on the ground," she told the
president, the book says.

The quality and credibility of information about the war's progress
became a source of ongoing tension within the administration,
according to the book. Rice complained about the Defense Department's
"overconfident" briefings during the tenure of Secretary Donald H.
Rumsfeld. Rather than receiving options on the war, Bush would get "a
fable, a story . . . that skirted the real problems," Rice is quoted
as saying.

According to Woodward, the president maintained an odd detachment from
the reviews of war policy during this period, turning much of the
process over to Hadley. "Let's cut to the chase," Bush told Woodward,
"Hadley drove a lot of this."

Nor, Woodward reports, did Bush express much urgency for change during
the months when sectarian killings and violent attacks against U.S.
forces in Iraq began rising, reaching more than 1,400 incidents a week
by October 2006 -- an average of more than eight an hour. "This is
nothing that you hurry," he told Woodward in one of the interviews,
when asked whether he had given his advisers a firm deadline for
recommending a revised war strategy.

In response to a question about how the White House settled on a troop
surge of five brigades after the military leadership in Washington had
reluctantly said it could provide two, Bush said: "Okay, I don't know
this. I'm not in these meetings, you'll be happy to hear, because I
got other things to do."

The book presents an evolving portrait of the president's decision-
making. On the one hand, the book portrays Bush as tentative and slow
to react to the escalating violence in Iraq; on the other, once he
decides that a surge is required, he is shown acting with focus and
determination to move ahead with his plan in the face of strong
resistance from his top military advisers at the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

Woodward also depicts the development of a close working relationship
between Bush and Maliki, with the president leaning on the Iraqi
leader to govern evenhandedly and to take decisive action against
sectarianism. "I've worked hard to get in a position where we can
relate human being to human being, and where I try to understand his
frustrations and his concerns, but also in a place where I am capable
of getting him to listen to me," Bush told Woodward.

Given Bush's efforts to earn Maliki's trust, the surveillance of the
Iraqi prime minister caused some consternation among several senior
U.S. officials, who questioned whether it was worth the risk, Woodward
reports. One official knowledgeable about the surveillance "recognized
the sensitivity of the issue and then asked, 'Would it be better if we
didn't?' "

Meanwhile, Woodward reports that Casey, the president's commanding
general in Iraq from 2004 to 2007, came to believe that Bush did not
understand the nature of the Iraq war, that the president focused too
much on body counts as a measure of progress.

"Casey had long concluded that one big problem with the war was the
president himself," Woodward writes. "He later told a colleague in
private that he had the impression that Bush reflected the 'radical
wing of the Republican Party that kept saying, "Kill the bastards!
Kill the bastards! And you'll succeed." ' "

Asked about his interest in body counts, Bush told Woodward: "I asked
that on occasion to find out whether or not we're fighting back.
Because the perception is that our guys are dying and they're not.
Because we don't put out numbers. We don't have a tally. On the other
hand, if I'm sitting here watching the casualties come in, I'd at
least like to know whether or not our soldiers are fighting."

The discord between Bush and Casey is one manifestation of the often-
debilitating rift that Woodward portrays between the U.S. military and
its civilian leadership. The book describes a "near revolt" in late
2006 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who felt that their advice was not
reaching the president. Adm. Michael Mullen, then serving as chief of
naval operations, expressed fear that the military would "take the
fall" for a failure in Iraq. According to the book, Casey and Abizaid
resolutely opposed the large surge that the president ultimately
ordered, as did Rumsfeld. Casey went so far as to refer to Baghdad as
a "troop sump." Within the administration, only the National Security
Council staff strongly supported the surge plan.

In the midst of the surge debate, Bush decided to replace Rumsfeld,
who had served as defense secretary throughout the war and had long
argued that the United States should "take the training wheels off the
Iraqi government." Bush chose Rumsfeld's replacement, Robert M. Gates,
without consulting Vice President Cheney, Rumsfeld's chief patron, the
book reports. Bush informed Cheney of his decision on Nov. 6, 2006,
the day before the mid-term elections. "Well, Mr. President, I
disagree," Cheney is quoted as saying, "but obviously it's your call."

Woodward's account also includes a portrait of Gen. David H. Petraeus,
who replaced Casey in Iraq. In one scene in the Oval Office in January
2007, Bush tells his new commander in Iraq that the surge is his
attempt to "double down." According to Woodward, Petraeus replies,
"Mr. President, this is not double down. This is all in."

"The War Within" also tells the story of retired Gen. Jack Keane, a
former Army vice chief of staff who used his high-level contacts in
the White House and the Pentagon to influence war policy and major
military personnel moves. A friend and mentor of Petraeus, Keane made
regular visits to Iraq to advise the new commanding general and then
briefed Cheney about each trip. In turn, Woodward reports, Bush sent a
back-channel message to Petraeus through Keane, circumventing the
chain of command.

In a critical epilogue assessing the president's performance as
commander-in-chief, Woodward concludes that Bush "rarely was the voice
of realism on the Iraq war" and "too often failed to lead."

During the interviews with Woodward, the president spoke of the war as
part of a recentering of American power in the Middle East. "And it
should be," Bush said. "And the reason it should be: It is the place
from which a deadly attack emanated. And it is the place where further
deadly attacks could emanate."

The president also conceded: "This war has created a lot of really
harsh emotion, out of which comes a lot of harsh rhetoric. One of my
failures has been to change the tone in Washington."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/04/AR2008090403160.html
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Acknee Wombuster (05.09.2008 22:24)
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